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THE TAKE AND GIVE OF ESA ADMINISTRATION: THE
NEED FOR CREATIVE SOLUTIONS IN THE FACE OF
EXPANDING REGULATORY PROSCRIiPTIONS
Christine 0. Gregoire* & Robert K. Costellot
Abstract: Salmon play a significant role in the culture, economy, and ecology of
Washington State. Their threatened extinctions have led to a string of listings under the
federal Endangered Species Act. This Article considers our response to these listings and the
relationship of that response to federal oversight. Part I discusses how the ESA will affect the
actions and activities of state and local governments and the citizens they serve. Part II
discusses the need for latitude on the part of the federal agencies in assessing the value of
state conservation and recovery efforts. This Article concludes that the plight of our salmon
and their listings under the ESA will require creative solutions by governments, businesses,
and individual citizens. The federal agencies responsible for administering the ESA must in
turn be allowed the flexibility to recognize and appropriately credit all state efforts in
recovery and conservation, even if those efforts are prospective and voluntary.

We in the Pacific Northwest have strong reasons to protect, preserve,
and restore the region's wildlife and ecosystems. The natural wonders
and resources of the Pacific Northwest attract and keep people here.
More than any other creature, salmon symbolize this region's heritage,
culture, and beauty. They are critical to the native ecosystems, the
economy, and the culture of Washington; they also have long-standing
value to the residents of this state. Moreover, salmon are of special
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importance to our Indian tribes. Treaties have consistently recognized the
vital role these fish play in Indian diet, religion, and economy.'
Despite salmon's tremendous importance to our way of life, we have
permitted these magnificent fish to dwindle to the point where some
populations may not survive. Many populations are now in danger of
extinction or are likely to become extinct in the foreseeable future.2
Since 1991, the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), an agency
within the U.S. Department of Commerce, has listed fifteen salmon species

that originate in or migrate through Washington as threatened or
endangered under the Endangered Species Act (ESA).3 Three others are

1. See, e.g., Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443
U.S. 658, 686 (1979) (noting that tribes in Washington "depended heavily on anadromous fish as a
source of food, commerce, and cultural cohesion" and were entitled by treaty to take up to 50% of
available salmon).
2. Under section 3 of the Endangered Species Act (ESA), a "species" includes "any distinct
population segment of any species of vertebrate fish or wildlife which interbreeds when mature." 16
U.S.C. § 1532(16) (1994). The National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) considers a salmon
population to be a distinct population segment, and therefore a species under the ESA, if the
population represents an "evolutionarily significant unit," or ESU. See 56 Fed. Reg. 58,612 (1991),
for the criteria NMFS uses to determine whether a population qualifies as an ESU. However, a
pending action alleges that NMFS has violated the federal Administrative Procedure Act in not
promulgating the criteria through formal rulemaking procedures. See Common Sense Salmon
Recovery v. Daley, No. 99CV01093 (D.D.C. filed May 4, 1999).
3. The Endangered Species Act is codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994). The
following are Washington salmon that have been listed under the ESA: Snake River sockeye
(endangered), 50 C.F.R § 222.23 (1998); upper Columbia River steelhead (endangered), 50 C.F.R.
§ 222.23(a); Snake River spring and summer chinook (threatened), 50 C.F.R. § 227A(g) (1998);
Snake River fall chinook (threatened), 50 C.F.R. § 227.4(h) (1998); Snake River Basin steelhead
(threatened), 50 C.F.R. § 227.4(1) (1998); lower Columbia River steelhead (threatened), 50 C.F.R.
§ 227.4(m) (1998); Puget Sound chinook (threatened), 64 Fed. Reg. 14,308, 14,319 (1999) (to be
codified at 50 C.F.R. § 223.102(a)(16)); lower Columbia River chinook (threatened), 64 Fed. Reg.
14,308, 14,321 (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. § 223.102(a)(17)); upper Willamette River chinook
(threatened), 64 Fed. Reg. 14,308, 14,323 (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. § 223.102(a)(18)); upper
Columbia River spring chinook (endangered), 64 Fed. Reg. 14,308, 14,324 (to be codified at 50
C.F.R. § 224.101(a)); Hood Canal summer chum (threatened), 64 Fed. Reg. 14,508, 14,513 (1999)
(to be codified at 50 C.F.R. § 223.102(a)(12)); Columbia River chum (threatened), 64 Fed. Reg.
14,508, 14,513 (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. § 223.102(a)(13)); upper Willamette River steelhead
(threatened), 64 Fed. Reg. 14,517, 14,524 (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. § 223.102(aX14)); middle
Columbia River steelhead (threatened), 64 Fed. Reg. 14,517, 14,525 (1999) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R.
§ 223.102(a)(15)); and Ozette Lake sockeye (threatened), 64 Fed. Reg. 14,528, 14,533 (1999) (to be
codified at 50 C.F.R. § 223.102(a)(19)). Many documents relating to the listing of these fish are available
on the Intemet See NMFS Northwest Regional Office, NMFS Northwest Home Page (visited Aug. 1,
1999) <http://www.nwr.noaa.gov>.
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candidates for listing.4 Three more species in the salmon family are listed or
proposed for listing.'
Although the listings are recent, the decline of our salmon stocks has not
happened overnight Salmon have been in decline for over a century.6 As
early as 1922, the Washington Supreme Court observed that "[i]t is a wellknown fact that the salmon industry of the state is rapidly disappearing.' In
its proposed listing of Puget Sound chinook, NMFS identified several
contemporary causes and warned that their effects will be amplified as
salmon populations continue to decline.8 Among the causes NMFS
identified were blockage or degradation of habitat, reduction of genetic

diversity resulting from hatchery releases, and high rates of commercial
exploitation. 9 Many factors have contributed to the blockage or degradation
of habitat. Among them are the decline in water quality; logging;
agricultural practices; diking, draining and filling of freshwater and
estuarine wetlands; and changes in temperature and flow regime associated
with damming and water diversion.1"
The recent listings of Puget Sound chinook and chum salmon are not the

first to affect our state. Beginning with Snake River sockeye in 1991,
NMFS has listed several species of salmon from the Columbia River
Basin. 1 A great deal of litigation has resulted. 2 The Columbia River Basin
4. See 60 Fed. Reg. 38,011, 38,022 (1995) (lower Columbia River/southwest Washington coho);
60 Fed. Reg. 38,011, 38,024 (Puget Sound/Strait of Georgia coho); 63 Fed. Reg. 11,750, 11,760
(1998) (Baker River (Skagit watershed) sockeye).
5. See 50 C.F.R. § 17.44(v) (1998) (Columbia River bull trout (threatened)); 63 Fed. Reg. 31,693
(1998) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. § 17.44(w)) (proposed June 10, 1998) (coastal Puget Sound bull
trout (proposed threatened)); 64 Fed. Reg. 16,397 (1999) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R.
§ 223.102(a)(20)) (proposed Apr. 5, 1999) (southwest Washington/Columbia River coastal cutthroat
trout (proposed threatened)).
6. See generally James A. Crutchfield & Giulio Pontecorvo, The Pacific Salmon Fisheries: A
Study of Irrational Conservation (1969); Courtland L. Smith, Salmon Fishers of the Columbia
(1979); Charles F. Wilkinson & Daniel K. Conner, The Law of the Pacfic Salmon Fishery:
Conservation and Allocation of a TransboundaryCommon Property Resource, 32 U. Kan. L. Rev.
17 (1983).
7. Vail v. Seaborg, 120 Wash. 126, 130,207 P. 15, 16 (1922).
8. See 63 Fed. Reg. 11,482, 11,494 (1998).
9. See id. at 11,494-95.
10. See id.
11. See supranote 3.
12. Many challenges were directed toward biological opinions concerning the operation of the
Federal Columbia River Power System. See, e.g., Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Bonneville Power
Admin., 175 F.3d 1156 (9th Cir. 1999); American Rivers v. National Marine Fisheries Serv., 126
F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 1997); Idaho Dep't ofFish & Game v. National Marine Fisheries Serv., 56 F.3d
1071 (9th Cir. 1995). See also Ramsey v. Kantor, 96 F.3d 434 (9th Cir. 1996) (alleging state-
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is currently in the grip of controversy over dam breaching, water
management, riparian land use, and other ESA-related issues. 3
The relationship between the well-being of our natural resources and the
well-being of our people has attracted attention. Although not always
successful, local efforts to conserve salmon have been ongoing since
statehood. During its first session, the Washington legislature established
the Office of Fish Commissioner to enforce laws "for the propagation,
protection and preservation of food fishes and oysters in the public waters
of the State of Washington."' 4 Since then, the legislature has acted many
times to protect salmon, and the Washington Attorney General's Office has
supported and defended those state conservation efforts.' 5 Despite governmental intervention, however, many salmon populations have become
nearly extinct.
Congress enacted the Endangered Species Act in 1973 to conserve
endangered and threatened species, as well as the ecosystems on which they
depend.' 6 Congress found that human activities, "untempered by adequate
concern and conservation,"' 17 had rendered some animals and plants extinct

managed Columbia River salmon fisheries violated ESA); Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Bonneville
Power Admin., 56 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir. 1995) (questioning Bonneville Power Administration's
decision to augment river flows to benefit salmon); Pacific Northwest Generating Coop. v. Brown,
38 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 1994) (challenging federal agencies' response to ESA listings of Columbia
River salmon).
13. The Northwest Power Planning Council maintains an electronic newsletter that keeps abreast
of ESA-related developments in the Columbia Basin. See Northwest Power Planning Council,
Columbia River Basin Bulletin (visited Aug. 1, 1999) <http://www.nwppe.org/bulletin/
bulletin.htm>.
14. 1889-1890 Wash. Laws 233.
15. See, e.g., State v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 92 Wash. 2d 894, 602 P.2d 1172 (1979) (Attorney
General assisted in successful criminal prosecution of company that violated conditions of
hydraulics permit issued to protect fish life); Washington Kelpers Ass'n v. State, 81 Wash. 2d 410,
502 P.2d 1170 (1972) (Attorney General successfully defended statute restricting salmon fishing
gears); Frach v. Schoettler, 46 Wash. 2d 281, 280 P.2d 1038 (1955) (Attorney General successfully
defended statute restricting salmon fishing in ocean); State ex rel. Campbell v. Case, 184 Wash. 334,
47 P.2d 24 (1935) (Attorney General successfully defended initiative banning fish traps); McMillan
v. Sims, 132 Wash. 265, 231 P. 943 (1925) (Attorney General successfully defended rule closing
Skagit Bay to commercial salmon fishing); Vail v. Seaborg, 120 Wash. 126, 207 P. 15 (1922)
(Attorney General successfully defended rule restricting salmon fishing in Puget Sound); Barker v.
State Fish Comm'n, 88 Wash. 73, 152 P. 537 (1915) (Attorney General successfully defended 1915
Fisheries Code); Purse Seine Vessel Owners Ass'n v. State, 92 Wash. App. 381, 966 P.2d 928
(1998) (Attorney General successfully defended administrative decision not to open commercial
herring spawn-on-kelp fishery).
16. See 16 U.S.C. § 153 1(b) (1994).
17. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(1) (1994).
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in the United States and threatened others with extinction."l Congress also
found that encouraging states to develop and maintain their own
conservation programs would serve national interests. 9
At the national level, the ESA represents a far-reaching attempt to
save endangered species. At the local level, the ESA represents
overlying legislation that affects the physical, cultural, and legal
landscapes in which we live. Because the ESA is a federal law that
preempts inconsistent state laws, it can diminish the independence we
have long cherished unless we take the initiative to recover and protect
our salmon.
The listings of salmon under the ESA present both opportunities and
challenges for the Pacific Northwest. Threatened extinctions have
triggered the ESA and have forced us to consider ways to prevent the
loss of this cherished resource. In this regard, the ESA is not an obstacle
to be avoided, but a talisman to be followed. In this arena, we face the
loss of more than just the fish.
In many ways, our nativ6 salmon are like the proverbial canary in the
coal mine. Salmon have many of the same physical needs as we humans.
Clean water is central among those needs. The decline of our salmon
runs is partly due to the decline in the quantity and quality of our water.
This causal relationship signals a threat to our own basic needs.
The commonality of interests between salmon and humans extends
beyond our shared physical needs. Abundant salmon stocks support
recreational and commercial fisheries and fishery-dependent industries,
which are vital to our state's economy. Moreover, healthy salmon stocks
offer employment and economic potential for thousands of Washington
residents.20
Salmon and their habitat are assets which, while intangible at times,
are of immense value. Salmon are a part of our image and our culture.
They symbolize cold, clear water in our rivers and streams and in the
Puget Sound. They symbolize sound stewardship of our forests and
agricultural lands. They symbolize preservation of the wild and scenic
parts of our state. In short, they symbolize the Pacific Northwest. It is
18. See 16 U.S.C. § 153 1(a)(2) (1994).

19. See 16 U.S.C. § 153 l(a)(5) (1994). See generally S. Rep. No. 93-307 (1973), reprinted in 1973
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2989.
20. See Governor's Rural Community Assistance Team, Washington State Rural Dev. Council,
EndangeredCommunities: Existing and PotentialSecondary Economic Impacts of Salmon Recovery
Initiatives (1996).
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these qualities which keep us here. It is these qualities which attract our
nation's best and brightest to come live and work here.
The people of Washington understand that what is good for salmon is
also good for water quality, the economy, and their own well-being. In
other words, what is good for salmon is also good for them. The effort to
save our salmon should not be seen as a question of how many fish we
must recover before returning to old ways. The effort is not a fight over
salmon, but a fight to protect the quality of life that makes the Pacific
Northwest a special place. It is a fight to save ourselves.
The challenge is to preserve simultaneously our salmon, our way of
life, and our independence. We can meet that challenge only by changing
the way in which governments, private citizens, and businesses approach
this unique problem. As mentioned above, the ESA represents an
opportunity and an incentive to help ourselves. Successful recovery of
our salmon requires collective effort. This effort will be comprised of
changes mandated by legislation, changes designed and implemented
collaboratively by both the public and the private sectors, and voluntary
changes motivated by the knowledge that salmon recovery is in our own
best interest.
Whether we view the ESA as an opportunity or a threat, it will prompt
us to act and respond differently in the conduct of our daily affairs. The
federal agencies responsible for administering the ESA will ensure that
we do so.2' However, these federal agencies must be allowed the
flexibility to recognize and credit state conservation efforts when they
administer the ESA, for example, when making listing and delisting
decisions. The creative solutions we devise, and the voluntary measures
we undertake must be accorded some value in the federal agencies'
assessment of our progress in protecting and recovering listed salmon.
This Article discusses our response to ESA listings and the need for
federal flexibility in considering that response. Part I describes how the
ESA will affect the actions and activities of state and local governments
and the citizens they serve. Part II discusses the need for federal agencies
to be flexible when they assess the value of state conservation and

21. Under a Memorandum of Understanding dated August 28, 1974, NMFS has ESA jurisdiction
over anadromous fish species such as salmon, while the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, an agency
within the U.S. Department of the Interior, has ESA jurisdiction over other species. See also 16
U.S.C. § 1532(15) (1994) (dividing ESA authority primarily between Department of Commerce and
Department of the Interior).
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recovery efforts, regardless of whether they are regulatory or voluntary,
permissive or mandatory.
I.

HOW THE ESA WILL AFFECT STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS AND THE CITIZENS THEY SERVE

A.

Structure of the ESA

The ultimate goal of the ESA is to return endangered and threatened
species to the point where they no longer need the statute's protection.'
To achieve this goal, the ESA has three basic missions: (1) to identify
species needing protection and the means necessary to protect and
recover those species; (2) to prevent harm to listed species; and (3) to
prevent and punish the taking of listed species and the destruction of
their habitats.'
Three major sections form the backbone of the ESA-sections 4, 7,
and 9. Section 4 contains the process for listing and delisting endangered
and threatened species, the designation of their critical habitat, and the
development of a recovery plan.24
Section 7 requires federal agencies to "insure" that any action they
authorize, fund, or take "is not likely to jeopardize the continued
existence of any endangered species or threatened species or result in the
destruction or adverse modification of [critical] habitat." If a federal
agency determines that its action may impact listed salmon, it must
consult with NMFS.26 This obligation can affect anyone seeking federal
action, funding, or authorization.
As part of section 7 consultation, NMFS prepares a biological opinion
analyzing the effects of the agency action on the listed species and its
critical habitat.2 7 If NMFS concludes that the action is likely to
jeopardize that species' continued existence, it may specify reasonable
and prudent alternatives. If, on the other hand, NMFS concludes that no
22. See 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (1994) (indicating that purpose of ESA is to "conserve" endangered
species); 16 U.S.C. § 1532(3) (1994) (defining conservation as "the use of all methods and
procedures which are necessary to bring any endangered species or threatened species to the point at
which the measures provided pursuant to this chapter are no longer necessary").
23. See 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b).
24. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (1994).
25. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1994). Section 7 is codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1994).
26. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(c)(1).

27. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3).
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jeopardy exists, it may issue an incidental take statement." This
statement authorizes the agency action even though endangered or
threatened species may incidentally be taken. z9
State and local governments may be able to utilize the section 7
consultation when their activities are so intertwined with those of the
federal government that it would be impractical to analyze them
separately. For example, in Ramsey v. National Marine Fisheries
Service, NMFS argued that when the planning of state-regulated
Columbia River salmon fisheries is intertwined with the planning of
federally regulated ocean fisheries, section 7 consultation is available to
the states "as part of ocean harvest management."3 The district court
agreed, concluding that "[section] 7 is the most appropriate, and perhaps
the only workable venue for ESA compliance" by Washington and
Oregon in their regulation of Columbia River fisheries.31 In affirming the
district court, the Ninth Circuit held that Washington did not violate the
ESA because its fishing regulations were "contemplated by an incidental
take statement issued under section 7... and 3 2are conducted in
compliance with the requirements of that statement.
Section 9 prohibits the "taking" of endangered species.33 Federal
regulations broadly define "take" to include the destruction of habitat as
well as the killing of individual animals.34 The agencies that administer
the ESA may adopt rules to prohibit the taking of threatened species.3 5
They have done so for most threatened species.36 Section 9 also makes it
28. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4) (setting forth content of incidental take statement).
29. Section 9 of the ESA otherwise prohibits the taking of endangered species. See 16 U.S.C.
§ 1538 (1994). Federal rules prohibit the taking of most threatened species. See 50 C.F.R §§ 17.31,
227.21 (1998).
30. Ramsey v. National Marine Fisheries Serv., No. 94-761-MA, op. and order at 13-14 n.8 (D.
Or. Apr. 4, 1995).
31.Id. at 17.
32. Ramsey v. Kantor, 96 F.3d 434,442 (9th Cir. 1996).
33. See 16 U.S.C. § 1538. The ESA prohibits any person from "tak[ing] any [endangered] species
within the United States or the territorial seas of the United States." 16 U.S.C § 1538(a)(1)(B).
34. See infra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
35. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d) (1994).
36. See 50 C.F.R. § 17.31 (1998) (prohibiting taking of threatened species under jurisdiction of
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service); 50 C.F.R. § 227.21 (1998) (prohibiting taking of certain threatened
salmon). In Sierra Club v. Clark, 755 F.2d 608, 612 (8th Cir. 1985), the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service argued that § 1533(d) gave it the authority to allow public trapping of threatened wolves.
The Eighth Circuit disagreed, noting that under § 1532(3), the Service lacked authority to adopt
regulations allowing the public to take threatened species except "in the extraordinary case where
population pressures within the ecosystem cannot be otherwise relieved." Id. at 614; cf Christy v.

The Take and Give of ESA Administration
unlawful for any person to "attempt to commit, solicit another to commit,
or cause to be committed" any offense defined in the ESA.37 The term
"person" is broadly defined to include individual citizens as well as "any
officer, employee, agent, department, or instrumentality ... of any State,
municipality, or political subdivision of a State... [and] any State,
'
municipality, or political subdivision of a State."38
The ESA defines the term "take" to encompass a wide variety of
actions, including to "harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot,wound, kill, trap,
'
capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct."39
Federal regulations further define "harm" to include "significant habitat
modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife by
significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns, including breeding,
feeding, or sheltering."' This definition has withstood challenge before
the U.S. Supreme Court.4 The same regulation defines "harass" as an
"intentional or negligent act or omission which creates the likelihood of
injury to wildlife by annoying it to such an extent as to significantly
disrupt normal behavioral patterns."42
The take prohibitions of section 9 can be enforced either by the federal
government or by private individuals pursuant to the citizen suit
provisions of the ESA.43 The Act fosters citizen suits by allowing
successful plaintiffs to recover attorney fees and other costs.'
1.

The Take ProhibitionsofSection 9 Are Expansive and Will Require
Us to Modify OurActions

The take prohibitions of the ESA and their implementing regulations
will require us-the citizens, businesses, and government agencies of
this state-to modify many of our regular activities we normally engage
in. Otherwise, these activities may constitute a take, which consists of the
following three elements: (1) an act or omission which (2) causes
Hodel, 857 F.2d 1324, 1333 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding that regulation allowing controlled hunting of
grizzly bears to relieve population pressure was supported by rational basis).
37. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(g).
38. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(13) (1994).
39. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (1994).
40.50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1998).

41. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
42.50 C.F.R. § 17.3.

43. See 16 U.S.C. § 1540 (1994).
44. See 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(4).
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(3) injury or death to a listed species or injury to the habitat on which it
depends.
Courts would likely find that direct assault on a listed species or
elimination of an essential component of its habitat constitutes a section
9 violation.45 More subtle actions or activities, however, may similarly be
prohibited. In Palila v. Hawaii Department of Land & Natural
Resources, the department's maintenance of feral goats and sheep in the
endangered palila birds' habitat gave rise to a take violation.' The palila
is found only in a small forested area on the slopes of Mauna Kea in
Hawaii; the feral goats and sheep ate the leaves, stems, seedlings, and
sprouts of a particular kind of tree on which the palila primarily
depended for food and shelter.47 In holding that the Department's actions
constituted a take, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding
that those actions endangered the palila.4' The Ninth Circuit supported its
conclusion with the legislative finding that the greatest threat to
endangered species is the destruction of their natural habitats.49
Other courts have reached similar conclusions. In Sierra Club v.
Lyng, ° the district court found that the U.S. Forest Service had
committed a take of the red cockaded woodpecker by managing federal
timberlands so as to produce only even-aged tree stands. Clearcutting
practices, the court said, impaired the "essential behavioral patterns" of
the woodpecker, resulting in a section 9 violation.5
Causation under section 9, like in tort law, can be direct or indirect.5"
Causation may be attributable directly to the defendant or to a third
45. An example is United States v. McKittrick, 142 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 1998), in which Mr.
McKittrick was successfully prosecuted by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service for intentionally
shooting an endangered gray wolf imported from Canada. Gray wolves, although endangered in
most areas of the United States, are plentiful in Canada. However, according to the Ninth Circuit,
"gray wolves are protected by the ESA based on where they are found, not where they originate.
Canadian gray wolves that migrate into the United States [naturally] assume protected status when
they cross the border." Id. at 1173 (citations omitted).
46. See 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981).
47. See Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Resources, 471 F. Supp. 985, 989-90 (D. Haw. 1979).
48. See Palila,639 F.2d at 497-98.
49. See id. at 498; see also Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Resources, 852 F.2d 1106,
1108 (9th Cir. 1988).
50. 694 F. Supp. 1260 (E.D. Tex. 1988), aff'd in part and vacated in part sub noma.Sierra Club v.
Yeutter, 926 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1991).
51. Id. at 1271.
52. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Greater Oregon, 515 U.S. 687, 697702 (1995).
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party. 3 Moreover, the act need not be the only cause of the prohibited
effect, 4or even the most important cause; it need only be a contributing
cause.
The injury under section 9 includes direct injury or death to a
particular animal, significant habitat modification or degradation, or
injury to the recovery prospects of a listed species.5 ' Thus, actions that
produce a substantial risk of injury to a species can constitute a take even
if no member of the species has been physically injured. 6 Courts have
not allowed an "experimental approach" to the survival of endangered
species.5 7
The ESA does not require that injury occur before an action can be
enjoined. 8 The definition of "harass" includes the concept of threatened
or potential injury. A take may result from injury to an animal or its
habitat; it may also arise from decreased chances for recovery. According to the Palilacourt, habitat destruction that prevents the recovery of a
species by affecting its essential behavioral patterns constitutes actual
injury and effects a taking under section 9 of the ESA. 9
Generally, unintentional and unknowing acts cannot escape scrutiny
under the take prohibition. However, the knowledge or mental state of
the actor becomes relevant when punishment is concerned. Knowing
violations are crimes, while civil penalties may be levied without proof
of mental state.' Therefore, in the absence of an incidental take
authorization, persons who catch listed salmon or yard logs through a
salmon-bearing stream may be guilty of a take under the ESA even if
they neither intended nor knew of the consequences of their actions.
Those who are involved in projects that will significantly degrade or
modify habitats are similarly at risk.

53. See Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155, 163-64 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 437

(1998).
54. See Palila,639 F.2d 49.
55. See Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Resources, 649 F. Supp. 1070 (D. Haw. 1986),
aff'd, 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988); 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1998).
56. See, e.g., Forest Conservation Council v. Rosboro Lumber Co., 50 F.3d 781, 784 (9th Cir.
1995) (finding that some actions may constitute a take because they pose high risks of certain or
imminent injury).
57. See Paila,649 F. Supp. at 1082.
58. See id.
59. See id.at 1075.
60. See 16 U.S.C. § 1540(a) (1994).
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Courts have also ruled that government agencies can violate section 9
of the ESA through indirect actions. For example, in Sierra Club v.
Yeutter, the Fifth Circuit held that the Forest Service's management of
timber stands constituted a taking of the red cockaded woodpecker.6
Similarly, the Eighth Circuit found the Environmental Protection
Agency's (EPA's) registration of pesticides containing strychnine to be a
taking because endangered species died from ingesting the poison, which
could be distributed only pursuant to EPA's registration scheme.62
Finally, as discussed above, the Palila court held that Hawaii's practice
of keeping wild goats and sheep in the habitat of the endangered palila
bird constituted a taking.63
2.

Potentialfor "Take" by Government Agencies Through Regulation,
Permitting,or Failureto Regulate

Some of the actions and activities described above obviously trigger
the take prohibitions of section 9. Less apparent, however, is the fact that
project proponents are not the only ones who are at risk of a take.
Permitting and regulatory agencies may also be at risk. This possibility
will affect the way agencies issue permits and administer regulations.
State and local governments administer myriad laws that often require
permits or other approvals. Examples include permits to engage in
logging activities under the Washington Forest Practices Act,' 4
substantial development permits under the Washington Shoreline
Management Act of 1971,65 hydraulic project approvals under the
Washington Fisheries Code,66 and grading and building permits under
local zoning codes.67
In the absence of the ESA, the issuance of these permits is largely
guided by state and local laws. Section 9 of the ESA, however, adds an
entirely new dimension to government permitting activities. In Strahan v.
Coxe, for example, the First Circuit indicated that a government agency
could violate section 9 merely by issuing permits and licenses or
61. See 926 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1991).
62. See Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA, 882 F.2d 1294, 1300-01 (8th Cir. 1989).
63. See supranotes 46-49 and accompanying text.
64. Wash. Rev. Code § 76.09 (1998).
65. Wash. Rev. Code § 90.58 (1998).
66. Wash. Rev. Code § 75.20 (1998).
67. See Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70 (1998).
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otherwise authorizing private activities.68 In the Strahan case,
environmental groups alleged that Massachusetts officials violated the
ESA by authorizing gillnet and lobster pot fishing.69 The trial court found
that endangered northern right whales, seasonally present in
Massachusetts waters, were becoming entangled in the fixed fishing
gears.70 It concluded that the mere licensing and permitting of such
fishing practices constituted a take under the ESA.7" Affirming the lower
court decision, the First Circuit noted that the ESA prohibits the acts not
only of those who take directly, but also "acts by third parties that allow
or authorize acts that exact a taking and that, but for the permitting
process, could not take place."'72 The court held that "a governmental
third party pursuant to whose authority an actor directly exacts a taking
of an endangered species may be deemed to have violated the provisions
of the ESA."73
In Strahan, Massachusetts argued that the licensing or permitting of
fishing gears is no different than the licensing of cars and drivers; its
authorization does not constitute a take any more than the licensing of
drivers and cars constitute a crime whenever an automobile is used to
break the law.74 In response, First Circuit pointed out that, unlike the
Department of Licensing, the fishery agency had licensed the use of
gillnets and lobster pots in a manner that was likely to result in an ESA
violation.75 The court viewed Massachusetts' efforts to minimize
entanglements and the fact that other activities exacted potentially
greater impacts on the listed species as irrelevant.7 6 Strahan illustrates
that a "person," broadly defined to include state and local governments
and subdivisions thereof, may violate the ESA by permitting or
otherwise authorizing the acts of third parties that exact a taking.
That government activities may constitute prohibited acts under the
ESA is not a new concept. In Defenders of Wildlife v. Environmental

68. See 127 F.3d 155, 158 (lst Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 81 (1998).
69. Massachusetts' Division of Fisheries, like Washington's Department of Fish and Wildlife,
regulates fishing in that state's inland and coastal waters. See id.
at 158.
70. See Strahan v. Coxe, 939 F. Supp. 963, 984 (D. Mass. 1996).
71. Seeid. at984-86.
72. Strahan, 127 F.3d at 163.
73. Id.
74. See id. at 163-64.
75. See id at 164.
76. See id at 164-65.
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Protection Agency, Eighth Circuit held that the EPA had taken
endangered species by continuing to register pesticides that contained
strychnine under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide
Act.77 The Strahan decision goes one step further, however, by applying
the ESA to state licensing decisions. The Ninth Circuit has not yet ruled
on this issue, but at least one district court in the circuit has addressed a
similar one. In GreaterEcosystem Alliance v. Lydig, the U.S. District
Court for the Western District of Washington confronted the question of
whether Washington wildlife officials, by authorizing the hunting of
black bears with hounds and bait, had taken listed grizzly bears that
inhabit the same region.78 The court concluded that they did.79
This potential liability may extend even further. Not only would
governments be liable for authorizing certain activities, they could also
be liable for failing to regulate in areas where they have the authority to
do so. Under general principles of tort and criminal law, an omission is
actionable if the defendant has a preexisting duty to act."° Consequently,
ESA liability for governmental inaction may turn upon the existence of
an underlying obligation to act.
The risk that governments may be liable under the ESA for inaction
was demonstrated in Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council.8 ' The issue in
that case was whether the county's failure to ban or effectively regulate
beach driving and certain artificial light sources constituted a violation of
the ESA. The case involved loggerhead and green sea turtles, which were
listed as threatened and endangered, respectively.82 Female adults of
these species come ashore in the spring to deposit their eggs in the
sand." Months later, the hatchling turtles break out of their shells at night
and make their way toward the brightest light on the horizon.' On
undeveloped beaches, the brightest light is the moon's reflection off the
water." On developed beaches, however, the brightest light can be inland

77. See 882 F.2d 1294, 1301 (8th Cir. 1989).
78. See No. C94-1536C, op. and order at 16-17 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 5, 1996).
79. See id.
80. For an interesting application of these principles to fisheries management, see Mesiar v.
Heckman, 964 P.2d 445 (Alaska 1998).
81. 148 F.3d 1231 (llthCir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1488 (1999).
82. See id. at 1234.
83. See id. at 1235.
84. See id.
85. See id.
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artificial lights.86 The plaintiffs alleged that the county had violated the
ESA by failing to restrict beach driving, which crushed the nests and the
young turtles, and by failing to regulate inland artificial lights.87
The court in Loggerhead Turtle left the ultimate question-whether
the county committed a take by failing to regulate these activitiesundecided. Nonetheless, it ruled that the plaintiffs had shown enough
causal connection to hold the county liable for "harmfully" inadequate
regulation of artificial beachfront lighting. 8 The potential for take
violations gives permitting agencies an additional reason to be careful
when making regulatory decisions.
The section 9 prohibitions 9 and the section 7 consultation requirements" will guide state and local officials in the discharge of their
permitting and regulatory responsibilities. The Washington Department
of Ecology regulates activities that affect water quality and quantity,
which are important to salmon survival. The Department issues several
kinds of permits under the federal Clean Water Act.9' Washington
Department of Natural Resources authorizes logging activities through
forest practices permits,92 which can affect salmon by raising the
temperature and silt content of streams. Washington's cities and counties
develop comprehensive land use plans under the state Growth
Management Act93 and issue building, grading, shoreline, and many
other development-related permits.94 The list of permitting and regulatory
responsibilities is extensive.
The listing of species under the ESA affects permitting and regulatory
decisionmaking, which in turn affects our lives. The listing of Puget
Sound chinook, for example, affected a highly urbanized area.95 We must
protect the Puget Sound chinook and other listed species from further

86. See U
87. See id.
88. See id at 1249.
89. See supranotes 33-42 and accompanying text.
90. See supranotes 25-29 and accompanying text.

91. Clean Water Act of 1977,33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994).
92. See Wash. Rev. Code § 76.09 (1998).
93. Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70A (1998).
94. See Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70 (1998) (Planning Enabling Act); Wash. Rev. Code § 90.58
(1998) (Shoreline Management Act).
95. See supra note 3.
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harm and develop effective recovery strategies to meet our obligations as
citizens, business leaders, and governmental officials.
Washington is currently developing a salmon recovery strategy that
will require the collective efforts of all.96 The strategy will likely involve
changes to state and local laws and regulations, economic incentives, and
grassroots initiatives. We can be assured that our sacrifices and commitments will matter to salmon's survival. We must also be assured,
however, that they will matter when the federal government administers
the Endangered Species Act with respect to Washington salmon.
II.

FEDERAL AGENCIES MUST HAVE THE FLEXIBILITY TO
CONSIDER CONSERVATION AND RECOVERY EFFORTS
MADE BY STATE, TRIBAL, AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

Implementation of the ESA raises significant concerns for state, tribal,
and local governments. If administered as Congress had intended,
however, the ESA also provides opportunities for governments,
industries, tribes, and private citizens to collaborate in the development
of effective programs for preserving salmon and other threatened or
endangered species. Congress envisioned that the federal agencies
administering the ESA would involve state and local governments in
their decisionmaking and would consider their protective effortsincluding the voluntary and prospective efforts of their citizens.97
Pursuant to section 4 of the ESA, the Secretary of the Interior or
Commerce must determine whether a species is threatened or endangered
based on the following five factors:
(A) present or threatened destruction, modification, or curtailment
of its habitat or range;
(B) overutilization for commercial, recreational, scientific, or
educational purposes;
(C) disease or predation;
96. See Washington Governor's Salmon Recovery Office, Salmon Recovery Home Page (visited
Aug. 1, 1999) <http://www.govemor.wa.gov/lcsci/sro.htn>.
97. See 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(5) (1994) (stating that "encouraging the States... to develop and
maintain conservation programs which meet national and international standards is a key to meeting
the Nation's international commitments and to better safeguarding, for the benefit of all citizens, the
Nation's heritage in fish, wildlife, and plants"); 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (c)(2) (1994) (stating that "Federal
agencies shall cooperate with State and local agencies to resolve water resource issues in concert
with conservation of endangered species").

The Take and Give of ESA Administration
(D) inadequacy of existing regulatory mechanisms; or
(E) other natural or man-made factors affecting its continued
98
existence.
In addition, § 1533(b)(1)(A) directs the Secretaries to take into account
the conservation efforts of states and their political subdivisions before
determining whether a species is endangered or threatened:
The Secretary shall make determinations required by [§ 1533(a)(1)]
solely on the basis of the best scientific and commercial data
available to him after conducting a review of the status of the
species and after taking into account those efforts, if any, being
made by any State or foreign nation, or any political subdivision of
a state or foreign nation, to protect such species, whether by
predator control, protection of habitat, and food supply, or other
conservation practices, within any area under its jurisdiction, or on
the high seas.99
Despite congressional intent, however, a recent decision by the U.S.
District Court for the District of Oregon makes it unclear whether
voluntary and nonregulatory efforts will be considered. In Oregon
Natural Resources Council v. Daley, the court held that NMFS's
decision not to list Oregon coastal coho salmon as threatened was
arbitrary and capricious." In reaching that conclusion, the court found
that the ESA precluded NMFS from considering, in its listing decision,
future or voluntary actions to which commitments had been made by the
state. 101 According to the court's rationale, listing decisions must stem
from current regulatory schemes rather than future or voluntary pledges
and commitments.0 2
To understand the significance of this issue and the impact of the
court's decision, some background regarding the impetus for, and the
development of, the Oregon plan is necessary. In 1995, spurred by
petitions to list coho along the Oregon coast, Oregon began working on a
conservation plan to recover and protect Oregon coastal coho. In
98. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1) (1994). The Secretaries use the same criteria when determining
whether to delist a species. See 50 C.F.R. § 424.11(c) (1998); see also Biodiversity Legal Found. v.
Babbitt, 900 F. Supp. 526,530 (D.D.C..1995).
99. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A) (1994) (emphasis added).
100. See 6 F. Supp. 2d 1139, 1160-61 (D. Or. 1998).

101. See id. at 1155.
102. See id.
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developing its plan, the Oregon Coastal Salmon Restoration Initiative
(OCSRI), Oregon drew guidance from NMFS's prior statements
regarding the appropriate content of a conservation plan. According to
those statements, such a plan should (1) identify the causes of the
species' decline; (2) establish priorities for action; (3) establish explicit
objectives and timelines; (4) adopt measures necessary to achieve those
objectives; (5) provide high levels of certainty that those measures will
be implemented (authorization, funding, etc.); (6) establish quantifiable
criteria for measuring progress; (7) establish a comprehensive monitoring
program; (8) integrate federal, state, tribal, local, corporate, and nongovernmental activities and projects; and (9) use an adaptive management approach that will allow the plan to be changed in response to new
information and scientific understandings.
Oregon believed that the OCSRI, developed in concert with NMFS,
addressed each of these elements. The plan identified the problems that
had led to the species' decline, contained a mix of regulatory and
programmatic measures calculated to address those problems, and
established a set of objectives. It also employed the concept of adaptive
management; it was designed to be a dynamic plan that would change as
new information arose or existing conditions changed.'0 3 Although the
OCSRI had a regulatory component, it ultimately contemplated
voluntary partnerships between the state, its political subdivisions, and
private property owners.
Taking the OCSRI into account, NMFS concluded that Oregon coastal
coho should not be listed as threatened. NMFS stated:
The OCSRI contains the tools necessary to ensure that adequate
habitat measures are ultimately adopted and implemented: a
comprehensive monitoring program, scientific review, and an
adaptive management program. Natural escapement has been
increasing markedly in recent years and reached 80,000 fish in
1996. On the basis of the harvest and hatchery improvements
together with the habitat protections in the [federal Northwest
Forest Plan] and given the improving trends in escapement, the
Oregon Coast coho is not likely to become endangered in the
interval between this decision and the adoption of improved habitat
measures by the State of Oregon. Under the April 1997
[Memorandum of Agreement] between NMFS and the governor of

103. See id. at 1147.
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Oregon... NMFS will propose to Oregon additional forest
practices modifications necessary to provide adequate habitat
conditions for coho. If these or other comparable protections are
not adopted within 2 years, NMFS will act promptly to change the
ESA status of this [species] to whatever extent may be warranted. 104
However, the district court in Oregon Natural Resources Council v.
Daley held that the ESA did not allow NMFS to consider all the steps
Oregon planned to take to protect its coastal coho.'0 5 The court remanded
the case to NMFS, which has since listed the fish as threatened."0 6 The
court recognized its duty to construe all parts of the ESA together, but
offered itself only one way to accomplish that task.' 7 It read
§ 1533(a)(1)(D) as restricting the types of state conservation efforts NMFS
may consider under § 1533(b)(1)(A)' ° Consequently, the court said that
NMFS may consider only current, enforceable state measures; it may not
give any weight to voluntary or future conservation efforts made by the
09
states.'
The ESA can be interpreted in a way that will give effect to
congressional intent without restricting the discretion of NMFS or
discounting state conservation efforts. Congress intended that NMFS
should review and consider any ongoing state conservation efforts NMFS
deems relevant before analyzing the listing factors of § 1533(a)(1). The
language of § 1533(b)(1)(A) indicates that Congress intended
§ 1533(b)(1)(A) and § 1533(a)(1) to work together, with neither section
limiting the other. For example, § 1533(b)(1)(A) mandates that NMFS
"make determinations required by subsection (a)(1) of this section" after
taking into account state efforts to protect the species in question.
Furthermore, § 1533(b)(1)(A) directs NMFS to consider any "efforts" made

104. 62 Fed. Reg. 24,588,24,607-08 (1997).
105. See 6 F. Supp. 2d at 1153-55.
106. See 50 C.FR. § 227.4(o) (1998).
107. The court stated the question as "whether § 1533(b)(1)(B) should be read merely to clarify what
types of 'existing regulatory mechanisms' may be considered as the fourth factor in § 1533(a)(1)(D) or
whether it should be interpreted to expand upon the five factors by, in effect, adding yet another factor."
Daley, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 1153.
108. The court also concluded that § 1533(a)(1)(D) limits the analysis NMFS may perform when
NMFS considers the other four factors of § 1533(aX1). See i at 1152 (Tr]he NMFS must determine,
based upon a rational analysis of the factors set forth in the ESA, and in light of current regulatory
measures, that the Oregon Coast ESU is not likely to become endangered in the foreseeable future.")
(emphasis added).
109. See id. at 1155.
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by a state before determining whether existing regulatory mechanisms are
adequate under § 1533(a)(1)(D).
The "conservation practices" the statute gives as examples of such
efforts-predator control and protection of habitat and food supply-are
not limited to regulatory programs. Such practices may include
nonregulatory efforts such as appropriate management of state-owned
lands, disease-control research, purchase of conservation easements, and
campaigns to encourage conservation-oriented policies and practices. The
ESA should be read in a way that gives NMFS the discretion to accord to
such efforts whatever weight it deems appropriate when performing the
1
requisite analysis under § 1533(a)(1)." 0
The rules implementing section 4 support this second interpretation.
They state that, in making a listing decision, NMFS has the discretion to
determine what weight it will give to a state's conclusion as to whether a
species is endangered or threatened."' The amount of weight thus accorded
by NMFS will depend, in part, on "the degree of protection afforded the
species."" 2 Such protection may include financial incentives to encourage
landowners to set aside streamside buffers or otherwise protect salmon
habitat voluntarily.
The language of section 4, taken as a whole, also suggests that NMFS
has discretion to weigh voluntary and prospective components of state
conservation efforts." 3 The factors NMFS must consider under section 4
are broad. For example, NMFS could hardly make any judgment about
"threatened" habitat destruction without taking into account prospective
or voluntary components of a state's efforts. Thus, all "efforts" a state
might make to protect a species should be relevant to the analysis.
Federal discretion to consider state conservation efforts should not end
when a species is listed. The goal of the ESA is to return species to the
point where they no longer need the statute's protection-in other words,
where they can be delisted. State recovery efforts also aim to achieve that
goal. NMFS uses the same criteria in listing as well as delisting

110. Cf Northern Spotted Owl v. Hodel, 716 F. Supp. 479, 480 (W.D. Wash. 1988) (finding that
agency is to assess data in record against listing criteria of§ 1533(a)(1) "and then to exercise its own
expert discretion in reaching its decision").
111. See 50 C.F.R. § 424.11 (e) (1998).
112. 50 C.F.R. § 424.11(e).
113. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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decisions." 4 Here again, NMFS must be able to consider all state
conservation efforts in making such decisions.
III. CONCLUSION
The reach of the Endangered Species Act is expansive and powerful.
As a consequence of the ESA and the listing of salmon species that
originate or migrate through Washington, we will have to make tough
choices in the way we conduct our lives. Washington's salmon strategy,
currently being refined, calls for collaboration between local, tribal, state
governments, and regulating federal agencies. It will also require the
cooperation of businesses and environmentalists, individuals as well as
groups. Although we all have different tasks, there is but one common
goal for which we will have to make sacrifices.
Our challenge is to preserve our salmon, our environment, our way of
life, and our independence. Whether viewed as a carrot or a stick, the
ESA calls on us to act and respond creatively. We have demonstrated our
ability to respond creatively; there is no doubt that we shall do so in
order to meet this challenge. The ESA must be read in a way that fosters
and recognizes creative solutions to evolving environmental issues. The
federal agencies must, in turn, be allowed the flexibility to consider and
appropriately credit all state efforts as they make listing and delisting
decisions and administer the ESA.

114. See supranote 98 and accompanying text.
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